It is hereby enacted as follows:- Preliminary Short title, extent and commencement. Determination of fair rent. Increase in fair rent in what case admissible. Landlord not to claim anything in excess of fair rent. Fine or premium not to be charged for grant, renewal or continuance of tenancy.
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Consequently, the application for leave to contest the eviction petition was also dismissed. The tenant was served with the summons of the eviction petition on 19th May, Such an application was subsequently made the next day on 4th June, , but was not accompanied by any application for condonation of the delay of one day in making the same.
Thereafter, the petitioner filed an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the said delay in filing the application which was dismissed by the Rent Controller on 4th August, , along with the application for leave to defend the eviction petition. It was contended on behalf of the Petitioner that by virtue of Subsection 7 of Section A of the Act, the procedure prescribed for trial of a suit under the Small Causes Courts Act was also applicable for trial of eviction petitions under the Act and by virtue of Section 17 of the Small Causes Courts Act, the Code of Civil Procedure has been made applicable to eviction proceedings as well.
It was also contended that it was, therefore, obligatory upon the part of the Rent Controller to have considered the merits of the eviction petition and to direct the landlord to lead evidence to prove the grounds for eviction taken by him. It was also urged before the High Court that mere rejection of an application for leave to contest did not ipso facto entitle the landlord to an order of eviction.
On the other hand, the Rent Controller should have recorded the evidence of the landlord and it is only after such evidence was recorded and the Rent Controller was satisfied as to the existence of grounds for eviction of the tenant under Section B of the Act, that the order of eviction could be passed. On consideration of the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, the High Court took the view that the provisions of Section A of the Act have an overriding effect on all other laws inconsistent therewith and that Subsection 7 of Section A of the Act and Section 17 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, , were not attracted to the facts of the case or in a situation where leave to contest has been declined for any reason whatsoever.
The High Court further held that under the circumstances, there was no statutory obligation upon the Rent Controller to frame issues or to try the eviction petition by calling upon the petitioner to lead evidence. The High Court further held that refusal to grant leave to contest amounts to admission of the contents of the eviction petition and if the eviction petition itself satisfies the requirements of Section B of the Act, an order of eviction has to follow as a matter of course.
As indicated hereinbefore, the case of the Petitioner is that both the Rent Controller and the High Court had erred in law in holding that the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply in a proceeding before the Rent Controller and that Section A of the Act would have an overriding effect over Section 29 2 of the Limitation Act, It was reiterated that by virtue of Sub-section 7 of Section A of the Act, the procedure prescribed for trial of suits in the Small Causes Courts Act, is also applicable for trial of eviction petitions since by virtue of Section 17 of the Small Causes Courts Act, the Code of Civil Procedure has been made applicable to eviction proceedings as well.
Appearing for the Petitioner, Mr. Ujjal Singh, learned advocate, referred to and relied upon the decision of this Court in Mukri Gopalan vs. Cheppilat Puthanpurajil Aboobacker [ 5 SCC 5], wherein a similar question had arisen with regard to the power of the Appellate Authority under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act, , to condone the delay in filing an appeal after expiry of the period of limitation prescribed under the Act.
This Court held that the conditions for applicability of Section 29 2 of the Limitation Act were satisfied since Section 18 is a special law and in the absence of any provision under the Limitation Act, for filing an appeal, the period of limitation provided under Section 18 would have to be treated to be different from that under the Limitation Act.
It was held that as a consequence, Section 5 of the Limitation Act would be automatically attracted to an appeal under Section 18 in the absence of any express exclusion under the Rent Act. It was further held that since the District Judges function as Appellate Authority under Section 18, such an authority is a court and not persona designata and, therefore, entitled to resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. It was further held that the Appellate Authority constituted under Section 18 of the Kerala Buildings Lease and Rent Control Act, , functions as a Court and as a result the period of limitation under the said provisions governing appeals would be computed keeping in view the provisions of Sections 4 to 24 of the Limitation Act, Reference was made to a decision of this Court in Gaya Prasad Kar vs.
Subrata Kumar Banerjee [ 8 SCC 14], wherein it was held that having regard to the beneficial provisions of the West Bengal Premises Tenancy Act, , which allowed extension of time for making deposit of arrears of rent, the provisions of the Limitation Act and, in particular, Section 5 thereof, would also be applicable.
It was held that since a statute can never be exhaustive, courts have jurisdiction to pass procedural orders, though not specifically contemplated by statute and that such innovation is permissible on the basis of authority supported by the principles of justice, good sense and reason. Certain other decisions were also referred to by learned counsel which are on similar lines.
On behalf of the Respondent it was submitted that Section B had been introduced in the Act by way of amendment in to make special provisions for Non-Resident Indians who return to India and are in need of immediate possession of their building or buildings let out by them.
Such benefit had been made available to a Non-Resident Indian only after a period of five years from the date on which the Non-Resident Indian became the owner of such building. It was contended that the provisions of the Act and, in particular, Section B thereof, would have to be very strictly construed on account of the object with which it had been enacted. In this regard reference was made to a decision of this Court in Prithipal Singh vs. Satpal Singh Dead through its LRs.
The said order was affirmed by the High Court observing that in view of Rule 23 of the Delhi Rent Control Rules, , the Rent Controller is conferred with power to set aside the ex-parte order of eviction in exercise of jurisdiction under the aforesaid provisions of the Code. On the said orders being questioned in this Court it was held that Rule 23 of the aforesaid Rules could not be applied in view of Section B which is a special code and provides for a specific and exhaustive procedure for eviction of a tenant by a landlord on ground of bonafide requirement.
The order of the High Court was, therefore, set aside and that of the Rent Controller was restored. Siri Pal Jain [ 2 RCR ], in a Civil Revision, where the very same question fell for consideration and it was held that when the tenant had failed to file affidavit seeking leave to contest the proceedings within the time prescribed, the Rent Controller had no power to condone the delay. Certain other cases were also referred to on the same lines relating to the Act and Sections B and A thereof.
From the materials on record it is clear that the application for leave to contest the application under Section B of the Act has to be made within 15 days from the date of service of the summons. In this case, the application for leave to contest the application was made one day after the said period had expired.
The issue for consideration before us is whether the Rent Controller was right in rejecting the application on the ground that he had no jurisdiction to condone the delay under the Act.
The matter was considered at length by the High Court, which, as indicated hereinabove, came to the conclusion that Section A of the Act would have an overriding effect on all other laws inconsistent therewith and that Sub-Section 8 of Section A of the Act and Section 17 of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, , were not attracted to the facts of the case.
This Court was of the view that Section B of the Delhi Rent Control Act was a complete Code by itself and other provisions could not, therefore, be brought into play in such proceedings. In the instant case, the same principle would apply having regard to the fact that the Rent Controller had not been conferred with power under Order 9 Rule 13 C.
Apart from the above is the view taken by this Court in Prakash H. Jain vs. Marie Fernandes [ 8 SCC ], where it was specifically held that since the Competent Authority under Section 40 of the Maharashtra Rent Control Act, , was not a court but a statutory authority with no power to condone the delay in filing an affidavit and application for leave to contest, the Competent Authority had no other option but to pass an order of eviction in the manner envisaged under the Act.
Ujjal Singh is distinguishable from the facts of this case. In the facts of the said case, it was the District Judges who were discharging the functions of the Appellate Authority and being a Court, it was held that the District Judge, functioning as the Appellate Authority, was a Court and not persona designate and was, therefore, entitled to resort to Section 5 of the Limitation Act.
That is not so in the instant case where the Rent Controller appointed by the State Government is a member of the Punjab Civil Services and, therefore, a persona designate who would not be entitled to apply the provisions of Section 5 of the Limitation Act, , as in the other case.
Section B is a power given to a Non-Resident Indian owner of a building to obtain immediate possession of a residential building or scheduled building when required for his or her use or for the use of any one ordinarily living with and dependent on him or her. The right has been limited to one application only during the life time of the owner.
Section A 2 of the aforesaid Act provides that after an application under Section B is received, the Controller shall issue summons for service on the tenant in the form specified in Schedule II. The said form indicates that within 15 days of service of the summons the tenant is required to appear before the Controller and apply for leave to contest the same.
There is no specific provision to vest the Rent Controller with authority to extend the time for making of such affidavit and the application. The Rent Controller being a creature of statute can only act in terms of the powers vested in him by statute and cannot, therefore, entertain an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of delay since the statute does not vest him with such power.
The Special Leave Petition must, therefore, fail and is dismissed accordingly. However, there will be no order as to costs.
Section 13-B of the East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
Whether repealed or otherwise affected by legislation This Act while repealing Ordinance No. Short title, extent and commencement 1. Short title, extent and commencement. Section 2. Definitions 2. These words shall be deemed to have been added as if this Act had been in force on the date of notification.
Punjab act 003 of 1949 : East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, 1949
In the High Court three points were raised. Ganpat And Others… v. Madan Lal And Anr. When rent was not tendered on that date, a right accrued to the respondents to claim the eviction. In the present revision Click to upgrade Your Package to have this feature. Debts Recovery Tribunal 1. Sections 17 to 23 deal with orders as to costs, execution, power to transfer proceedings, penalties etc.